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Exclusive Rights to Saving the Planet: The
Patenting of Geoengineering Inventions
By Anthony E. Chavez*
We will not be able to curtail greenhouse-gas emissions quickly enough to avoid
significant climate change. Thus, we should anticipate that society will consider
implementing climate engineering, either to avert a climate catastrophe or to reduce
atmospheric carbon. Although geoengineering research is still in its infancy, in recent
years the number of geoengineering patents and patent applications has increased
dramatically. Because of the importance of these technologies to society’s future, the
United States needs to ensure that these patents do not deter innovation or prevent these
technologies from being available for implementation. Specifically, the United States
should develop unique procedures to approve these applications and form a
geoengineering patent pool that will facilitate both innovation and accessibility.
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I.
¶1

¶2

¶3

The Fifth Assessment Report of the United Nations’ Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change warns that the planet is rapidly reaching a dangerous level of warming.1
Furthermore, it reports that much of the carbon dioxide causing this warming will remain
in the atmosphere for a millennium.2 Many scientists have urged studying geoengineering
as a means to avert a climate emergency or to reduce the level of CO2 in the atmosphere.
Some have begun researching climate-engineering methods and have patented their
inventions.
Over the past five years, the number of climate-engineering patents has
skyrocketed. The patent system, however, may not be ready for the implications of this
wave of new applications and may in fact hinder the development of these technologies.
Already, one company has cancelled testing of a geoengineering method because of a
dispute over a patent.3 One leading advocate of climate engineering argues for a
categorical ban of geoengineering patents altogether.4
This Article explores the patenting of geoengineering inventions and its potential
impact. To place this issue in its appropriate context, Section II reviews the current and
future state of the global climate and discusses the basics of geoengineering. Section III
explores the current trends in geoengineering patents. Section IV reviews methods used
previously to ameliorate problems with the patent system. Finally, Section V proposes an
approach to address the concerns raised by geoengineering patents.
II.

¶4

INTRODUCTION

UNAVOIDABLE AND LONG-LASTING CLIMATE CHANGE WILL NECESSITATE
CONSIDERATION FOR CLIMATE ENGINEERING

Dangerous climate change is unavoidable. Structural barriers will prevent a quick
reduction in greenhouse emissions. The resulting delay will ensure that warming will
have severe consequences. Even worse, the long lifespan of atmospheric carbon will keep
1

Todd Sanford et al., The Climate Policy Narrative for a Dangerously Warming World, 4 NATURE
CLIMATE CHANGE 164, 164 (2014). Present emissions exceed the Fifth Assessment Report’s highest
Representative Concentration Pathway, in which total emissions exceed the 2°C budget by mid-century. Id.
The 2°C rise had been the level at which avoiding dangerous climate change could be avoided, but many
now believe that level should be set at 1.5°C. Id.
2
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 472 (2013) [hereinafter IPCC].
3
Daniel Cressey, Cancelled Project Spurs Debate over Geoengineering Patents, 485 NATURE 429, 429
(2012).
4
Anne C. Mulkern, Researcher: Ban Patents on Geoengineering Technology, SCI. AM. (Apr. 18, 2012),
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/researcher-ban-patents-on-geoengineering-technology/.

2

Vol. 13:1]

Anthony E. Chavez

the global temperature at its new level for a millennium. Mitigation alone cannot avert
these consequences. As a result, we need to consider climate-engineering methods to
reduce the level of carbon in the atmosphere to avoid a climate catastrophe.
A.
¶5

¶6

The global scientific community agrees that we must hold global warming below
2°C to avoid “dangerous climate change.”5 This goal, however, is now “patently
unrealistic.”6 Even more troubling, scientists now project the effects of a 2°C rise to be
worse than anticipated, identifying such an increase as “dangerous” or “extremely
dangerous” climate change.7
Indeed, the National Research Council (NRC) recently reported that the earth is
warming so quickly that abrupt and unpredictable consequences are foreseeable in a few
decades, or worse, maybe just a few years.8 In its December 2013 report, the NRC
analyzed the likelihood of “abrupt climate changes” occurring in the near future.9 The
report concluded that the effects of climate change have already begun,10 and that more
can be anticipated.11 Furthermore, the risk of reaching various “tipping points”12 has
increased markedly.13 Indeed, months later, two groups of scientists concluded that a
large portion of the West Antarctic ice sheet has begun an irreversible collapse,14 which
will eventually raise global sea levels by several feet.15
B.

¶7

Significant Climate Change Is Becoming Unavoidable

The Rise in the Planet’s Temperature Will Continue and Last for Centuries

Although we can already project that global temperatures will reach dangerous
levels, we can also anticipate that, regardless of what steps we take now, warming will
continue in the near term. Furthermore, global temperatures will remain at their new

5
Wil Burns, Introduction: Climate Change Geoengineering, 7 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 87, 87
(2013) (internal citations omitted).
6
Id. Indeed, a United Nations report notes that current emission trends and commitments project
warming reaching 3.5°C to 5°C by 2100. WORLD BANK, TURN DOWN THE HEAT 1 (2013).
7
Kevin Anderson & Alice Bows, Beyond “Dangerous” Climate Change: Emission Scenarios for a New
World, 369 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y A 20, 23 (2011).
8
Tony Barboza, Studies Warn of Abrupt Environmental Effects of Warming, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2013),
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/dec/03/local/la-me-climate-urgency-20131204 (citing NAT’L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, ABRUPT IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: ANTICIPATING SURPRISES (2013), available at
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=18373).
9
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 8, at 21. The report identifies “abrupt climate changes” as
“abrupt changes in the physical climate system.”Id. at 2.
10
Id. at 3. These changes include the disappearance of late-summer Arctic sea ice and increases in
extinction rates. Id.
11
Id. at 14–17 (identifying the following as abrupt changes with a moderate likelihood of occurring this
century: decrease in ocean oxygen, increase in heat waves, increase in precipitation events, and rapid
changes in ecosystems and species habitats).
12
“Tipping points” are thresholds beyond which major and rapid changes occur when crossed. Id. at vii.
13
Barboza, supra note 8.
14
Ian Joughlin, Benjamin E. Smith & Brooke Medley, Marine Ice Sheet Collapse Potentially Under
Way for the Thwaites Glacier Basin, West Antarctica, SCIENCE, May 16, 2014, at 735, 738.
15
E. Rignot et al., Widespread, Rapid Grounding Line Retreat of Pine Island, Thwaites, Smith, and
Kohler Glaciers, West Antarctica, from 1992 to 2011, 41 GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS 3502, 3502 (2014).
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levels for centuries. This will occur for a number of reasons, including both an inability
to reduce emissions rapidly and the long atmospheric life of carbon.
¶8
As noted previously, current commitments to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions
contemplate continued emissions.16 Scientists have concluded, however, that the eventual
increase in peak warming is equivalent to the increase in total emissions. For instance, an
annual increase in cumulative CO2 emissions of 0.5% will lead to a comparable increase
in peak-committed warming of approximately 0.5%.17 Consequently, if society delays
reducing emissions for ten years, such a delay would cause peak warming to be 5%
higher than it might have been otherwise.18 A longer delay in emissions reductions will
result in a commensurately higher peak warming.
¶9
Delays in emissions reductions will also render certain peak-warming targets
unattainable. Assuming that society eventually achieves a zero-emissions rate (neither a
net increase in carbon emissions nor a net extraction of atmospheric carbon), the total
amount of emitted carbon determines the lowest peak warming.19 As a result, by 2012,
the 1.5°C peak-warming target became unachievable. The 2°C peak-warming target will
become similarly unachievable by 2027.20
¶10
We can also anticipate that by the time we commit to reducing carbon emissions,
our ability to do so will be limited. Historically, society has required fifty to sixty years to
switch to a new energy source for half of global energy needs.21 This delay results from
the level of investment and infrastructural change that a transition to a new energy source
requires.22 Unfortunately, postponing this shift to renewables results in “carbon lockin”—referring to the continued construction of fossil-fuel infrastructure. As society
invests more in carbon infrastructure, fewer options to reduce emissions remain and the
commitment to fossil fuels becomes more expensive to abandon.23

16

WORLD BANK, supra note 6, at 1.
Myles R. Allen & Thomas F. Stocker, Impact of Delay in Reducing Carbon Dioxide Emissions, 4
NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 23, 24 (2014). Allen and Stocker use an increase of 2% in their calculation.
However, the mean annual increase of atmospheric carbon has averaged 0.57% since 2005. See Annual
Data: Atmospheric CO2, CO2NOW.ORG, http://co2now.org/current-co2/co2-now/annual-co2.html (last
visited Sept. 14, 2014). Accordingly, this Article uses 0.50% to better approximate the actual increase of
atmospheric carbon.
18
Allen & Stocker, supra note 17, at 24.
19
Thomas F. Stockey, The Closing Door of Climate Targets, SCIENCE, Jan. 18, 2013, at 280, 281.
20
Id.
21
Vaclav Smil, The Long Slow Rise of Solar and Wind, SCI. AM., Jan. 2014, at 52, 54. For instance, the
transition from wood to coal as the primary energy source took sixty years. Id. at 55. Subsequent
transitions, however, have taken longer. Oil, after nearly ninety years of use, provides only 40% of world
energy. Similarly, the transition from oil to natural gas is occurring at an even slower rate. Id. Indeed,
natural gas has required fifty-five years to supply 25% of the world energy market. By comparison, oil
required only forty years and coal required only thirty-five years. Id. at 56. The transition to renewable
energy is proceeding even more slowly. After twenty years of subsidized development, “new” renewables
(wind, solar, modern biofuels) provide less than 5% of global energy. Id. at 54–55.
22
Id. at 56. Globally, the investment in energy infrastructure—including coal mines, oil wells, gas
pipelines, refineries, and filling stations—is worth at least $20 trillion. Id. at 57. Furthermore, power plants
have average lives of twenty-five to fifty years, and some have operational lives of up to 100 years.
Consequently, only 2%–4% of existing sources require replacement in a given year. Gert Jan Kramer &
Martin Haigh, No Quick Switch to Low-Carbon Energy, 462 NATURE 568, 568 (2009).
23
UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, THE EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 21 (2013).
17
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¶11

Finally, delays in emissions cuts necessitate much larger reductions in future
emissions.24 Delay causes the atmospheric CO2 to peak higher and later, which requires
much sharper cuts to attain a particular level.25 Unfortunately, economic models indicate
that our ability to reduce emissions may not surpass 5% per year.26 We can thus foresee
that regardless of our future commitment to cut emissions, several structural barriers will
limit the rate at which this reduction can occur.
¶12
Besides these structural barriers to reducing carbon emissions, scientists calculate
that once we eliminate carbon emissions, planetary warming will continue for decades,
with eventual global temperatures remaining at these new levels for centuries. Even with
rapid mitigation of carbon emissions, radiative forcing will continue to increase for
nearly ten years,27 while the thermal inertia of the ocean will delay the full magnitude of
warming. Initially, the ocean absorbs heat, but then it radiates this heat for hundreds of
years.28 Thus, taking into account these different factors, even after carbon emissions
cease, the global temperature will continue to increase significantly,29 and will then
remain at its new level for what many believe to be at least 1,000 years.30 In sum, merely
cutting emissions will not suffice—a true solution requires reducing atmospheric
carbon.31
C.

Climate Engineering: What It Is and How It Can Help

¶13

The science underlying climate change demonstrates two key considerations. First,
significant climate disruption is inevitable, regardless of future emission levels. Second,
mitigation alone cannot return the planet to its preindustrial state. To avoid severe climate
disruption, we will need to explore a broad range of options. One of these options is
climate engineering.
¶14
Climate engineering32 identifies a broad range of methods and technologies
intended to alter the earth’s climate system, counteracting climate change and the effects
24

Bryan K. Mignone et al., Atmospheric Stabilization and the Timing of Carbon Mitigation, 88
CLIMATIC CHANGE 251, 253 (2008).
25
Id. at 255.
26
See Stockey, supra note 19, at 281.
27
See Detlef P. van Vuuren & Elke Stehfest, If Climate Action Becomes Urgent: The Importance of
Response Times for Various Climate Strategies, 121 CLIMATIC CHANGE 473, 480 (2013).
28
See JEFF GOODELL, HOW TO COOL THE PLANET 10 (2010).
29
H. Damon Matthews & Ken Caldeira, Stabilizing Climate Requires Near-Zero Emissions, 35
GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS 1, 1 (2008). The IPCC estimates that if the composition of the atmosphere
were to be held constant, the global temperature would still rise by up to 0.9°C by the end of the 21st
Century. IPCC, supra note 2, at 822.
30
See Susan Solomon et al., Irreversible Climate Change Due to Carbon Dioxide Emissions, 106 PROC.
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 1704, 1704 (2009).
31
As one of the authors of the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report describes the situation, “A large fraction
of climate change is thus irreversible on a human timescale, except if net anthropogenic CO2 emissions
were strongly negative over a sustained period.” Fred Pearce, World Won’t Cool Without Geoengineering,
Warns Report, NEW SCIENTIST (Sept. 25, 2013, 11:40 AM), http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn24261world-wont-cool-without-geoengineering-warns-report.html#.U11Md1cvBfS.
32
Numerous terms besides “climate engineering” have been used to refer to these efforts, including
“geoengineering,” which appears most frequently. Although “climate engineering” may more accurately
describe the processes, here it will be used interchangeably with “geoengineering.” BART GORDON, H.R.
COMM. ON SCI. & TECH., 111TH CONG., ENGINEERING THE CLIMATE: RESEARCH NEEDS AND STRATEGIES
FOR INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION 39 (2010).
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thereof.33 Geoengineering is set apart from other acts that alter planetary systems in two
ways: it involves deliberate efforts and requires global cooperation.34
¶15
Climate engineering techniques fall into two broad categories.35 The first, solar
radiation management (SRM), would increase the reflection of sunlight to cool the
planet.36 The second, carbon dioxide removal (CDR), would remove CO2 from the
atmosphere.
¶16
SRM techniques reflect a small percentage of inbound light and heat from the sun
back into space.37 They cover a range of methods and costs; some are simplistic while
others are technologically complex and potentially prohibitively expensive.38 These
techniques also vary as to the part of the environment they affect, such as the earth’s
surface, its atmosphere, or outer space. Surface-based techniques include painting roofs
white, planting more reflective crops, and covering desert or ocean surfaces with
reflective materials.39 Atmospheric methods would increase the reflectivity of clouds (by
adding sea salt or other materials to whiten clouds) or inject aerosol particles into the
atmosphere. The latter would mimic the temporary global cooling following the ejection
of sulfur particles from volcanoes.40 A major advantage of some SRM techniques is that
they may be the only means to reduce the global temperature almost immediately, should
that become necessary to avert a climate emergency or to buy time to more fully
implement mitigation procedures.41
¶17
In contrast to SRM, CDR removes CO2 directly from the atmosphere. CDR
techniques involve methods that store CO2 in the ocean or ground. Ocean-based methods
include ocean fertilization, which promotes the growth of carbon-consuming
phytoplankton, and enhanced upwelling/downwelling, which alters ocean circulation to
increase the availability of nutrients to enhance phytoplankton growth (upwelling) while
accelerating the return of CO2-concentrated surface water to the deep sea
(downwelling).42 Land-based techniques include direct air capture and sequestration, the
use of biomass and sequestration, and afforestation.43
33

IPCC, supra note 2, at 23, Annex I.
See ROYAL SOC’Y, GEOENGINEERING THE CLIMATE: SCIENCE, GOVERNANCE AND UNCERTAINTY ix
(2009).
35
The Royal Society, the United Kingdom’s national academy of sciences, produced a seminal analysis
of geoengineering that utilized this distinction. Id. at 1. Subsequent reports, including those prepared by a
House subcommittee, the National Regulatory Commission, the Government Accountability Office, and
the IPCC, have followed this dichotomy. See supra notes 2, 8, 32, and infra note 40.
36
IPCC, supra note 2, at 91.
37
ROYAL SOC’Y, supra note 34, at 23.
38
Space-based reflective mirrors, for instance, could require several decades and trillions of dollars to
put into place. Roger Angel, Feasibility of Cooling the Earth with a Cloud of Small Spacecraft near the
Inner Lagrange Point (L1), 103 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 17184, 17189 (2006).
39
Peter J. Irvine, Andy Ridgwell, & Daniel J. Lunt, Climatic Effects of Surface Albedo Geoengineering,
116 J. GEOPHYSICAL RES. 2 (2011).
40
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-903, CLIMATE CHANGE: A COORDINATED STRATEGY
COULD FOCUS FEDERAL GEOENGINEERING RESEARCH AND INFORM GOVERNANCE EFFORTS 10 (2010)
[hereinafter GAO CLIMATE CHANGE REPORT]. Aerosol methods are modeled after the global cooling effect
produced when volcanoes emit sulfur into the atmosphere. For instance, when Mount Pinatubo erupted in
1991, it cooled the globe by approximately 0.5°C in less than one year. David W. Keith, Edward Parson &
M. Granger Morgan, Research on Global Sun Block Needed Now, 463 NATURE 426, 426 (2010).
41
IPCC, supra note 2, at 91, 96.
42
GAO CLIMATE CHANGE REPORT, supra note 40, at 7.
43
Id. at 8. “Afforestation” refers to the establishment of trees on non-treed land. INTERGOVERNMENTAL
34
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CDR removes CO2 directly from the atmosphere by either increasing naturalcarbon sinks or using chemical engineering to remove CO2.44 CDR can thus reverse
planetary warming by reducing the atmosphere’s CO2 content. However, it requires the
reduction of a significant fraction of CO2 before it can alter the atmospheric balance.
CDR may therefore require several decades to have a discernible effect on the
environment. On the other hand, its ability to lower the CO2 content of the atmosphere
may become critical if significant mitigation efforts come too late to prevent CO2 from
reaching levels causing dangerous warming.45 And in contrast to SRM methods, CDR
involves fewer environmental risks. By removing CO2 from the atmosphere, CDR simply
returns the atmosphere to its preindustrial state. This differs from SRM, which,
notwithstanding several possible adverse consequences, would only create an artificial
and approximate balance between increased atmospheric-gas concentrations and sunlight
levels.46
III.

¶19

Anthony E. Chavez

THE INFANCY OF CLIMATE-ENGINEERING RESEARCH AND THE IMPACT OF PATENTS
ON FUTURE DEVELOPMENT

Concerted geoengineering research remains in its infancy. Nevertheless, the
patenting of related inventions has grown substantially over the past five years. A number
of these patents’ characteristics, however, suggest that they might deter access to this
technology, potentially stymieing future climate-engineering innovation.
A.

¶20

Patent Law Basics

The power to award patents derives from the Constitution. Article I provides that,
“Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries.”47 Through the Patent Act of 1790, Congress
established the first patent system for the United States.48 Congress passed five
subsequent Patent Acts.49 The 2011 America Invents Act (AIA) was the first major

PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, LAND USE, LAND-USE CHANGE AND FORESTRY (2000), available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/sres/land_use/index.php?idp=47.
44
IPCC, supra note 2, at 9.
45
For instance, in its emissions report, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) calculates
that scenarios with a “likely” chance of meeting the 2°C target have net negative total greenhouse
emissions. To achieve this result, these scenarios assume utilization of carbon capture and storage, a CDR
technology. UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, THE EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 3 (2012).
46
GAO CLIMATE CHANGE REPORT, supra note 40, at 4.
47
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
48
Benjamin K. Sovacool, Placing a Glove on the Invisible Hand: How Intellectual Property Rights May
Impede Innovation in Energy Research and Development (R&D), 18 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 381, 385
(2008). Under the Patent Act, a board consisting of the Secretaries of State and War and the Attorney
General would consider all patent applications. Id.
49
Jesse S. Chui, To What Extent Can Congress Change the Patent Right Without Effecting a Taking?,
34 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 447, 448 (2007).
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reform in patent law since 1952.50 As discussed later, the AIA provides a process for
prioritized examination of patent applications.51
An inventor commences the patent process by submitting an application to the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).52 The USPTO assigns the
application to an examiner who specializes in that field.53 The examiner then searches
previous patents and patent applications, referred to as “prior art,” to determine if the new
application involves a novel, useful, and nonobvious invention.54 The application may
proceed through several rounds of internal evaluation, interviews of the applicant, and
possibly even appeals before the agency grants the patent.55
The patent application process can be both long and expensive. Processing an
application often requires multiple years,56 with an average pendency of 29.8 months.57
Applicants typically spend tens of thousands of dollars on, among other things, attorneys’
fees, pre-filing searches, drawing fees, and filing fees before receiving their patents.58
Patents involving environment-oriented inventions tend to be more complicated, and
consequently, usually require longer processing times and higher costs.59
The grant of a patent provides one primary benefit: the patent owner may exclude
others from using the invention. Specifically, the patentee can exclude another from
making, using, or selling any patented invention,60 retaining this right for twenty years.61
In exchange for this right, the patentee discloses her invention to the public in the manner
required by statute.62 The patentee may receive royalties by licensing the invention
during the period of the patent.63
The patent system provides several other benefits. The exclusivity provided by
patents grants monopoly powers, which foster innovation by enabling inventors to profit
from their work.64 For twenty years, inventors can choose to use their inventions, license
them to others, or keep them off the market. This enables inventors to recover research
50

Caitlin E. Lanning, Mapping Our Future: The Impact of Gene Patents on Scientific Research and
Health Care in the United States, 26 J.L. & HEALTH 375, 397 (2013).
51
Id. at 401.
52
35 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) (2012).
53
Michael A. Carrier, Post-Grant Opposition: A Proposal and a Comparison to the America Invents
Act, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 103, 106 (2011).
54
Id.
55
Gregory N. Mandel, Promoting Environmental Innovation with Intellectual Property Innovation: A
New Basis for Patent Rewards, 24 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 51, 61 (2005).
56
Patent Time Frame: How Long Does It Take to Get a Patent?, UNIV. CAL. SANTA BARBARA OFFICE
OF TECH. & INDUS. ALLIANCES, http://tia.ucsb.edu/faculty/information-resources/patent-basics/ (last visited
Sept. 14, 2014).
57
Data Visualization Center, USPTO, http://www.uspto.gov/dashboards/patents/main.dashxml (last
visited July 28, 2013).
58
See Emilie Winckel, Hardly a Black-and-White Matter: Analyzing the Validity and Protection of
Single-Color Trademarks Within the Fashion Industry, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1015, 1018 n.13 (2013).
59
Mandel, supra note 55, at 61.
60
35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012).
61
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012) (stating that the term of the patent lasts from the date on which the
patent issues to twenty years after the date on which the inventor filed the application).
62
35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012).
63
See Nicholas G. Smith, Medimmune v. Genentech: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Supreme
Court’s Continued Assault on the Patentee, 15 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 503, 516 (2011).
64
Scott Taylor, Where Are the Green Machines?: Using the Patent System to Encourage Green
Invention and Technology Transfer, 23 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 577, 583 (2011).
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and development costs and prevents free riding.65 It also provides inventors with several
competitive advantages, especially the ability to attract venture capital and the
opportunity to develop related products.66 And importantly, this system promotes full
disclosure of inventions. Early disclosure avoids the wasting of resources in unnecessary
experimentation67 and facilitates the development of successive inventions, thereby
fostering technological advancement.68
¶25
Despite these benefits, the patent system imposes various costs. For instance, the
effective monopoly power provided to inventors raises the invention’s price, thus
decreasing its overall availability to society during the patent period.69 In addition,
multiple inventors may waste resources by duplicating inventions that have limited
availability.70 Among others, these costs must be weighed against the likely benefits of
any potential modification of the patent system.
B.

Dramatic Increase in Climate-Engineering Patents and Recent Issues

¶26

Despite the relative infancy of climate-engineering technologies, various entities
are currently confronting issues that will drastically influence their development. The
USPTO has already received hundreds of applications for patents on these technologies.
Furthermore, the number of geoengineering patents granted by the agency has risen
dramatically. But a review of these patents illustrates several disturbing trends—
specifically, how the breadth of some of these patents could block future developments.
Moreover, original inventors are reassigning these patents at an alarming pace,
concentrating these patents in the hands of a limited number of patent holders.
¶27
This author directed a review of USPTO records to determine trends in applications
for and granting of patents involving climate-engineering technologies. The review
searched the USPTO database using words describing the most common SRM and CDR
methods.71 The review included only patents related to one of these two categories,
excluding patents pertaining to short-term weather modification. As described below, this
review focused on both patent applications72 and patents awarded.
65
Niels J. Melius, Trolling for Standards: How Courts and the Administrative State Can Help Deter
Patent Holdup and Promote Innovation, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 161, 169 (2012).
66
Sarah Tran, Prioritizing Innovation, 30 WIS. INT’L L.J. 499, 520 (2012).
67
Cf. Michael S. Mireles, An Examination of Patents, Licensing, Research Tools, and the Tragedy of the
Anticommons in Biotechnology Innovation, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 141, 153 (2004).
68
See Taylor, supra note 64, at 583. Commentators recognize an additional benefit known as the
“prospect theory.” This refers to the notion that the patent holder can encourage successive inventors to
share information and avoid duplicative research. Mireles, supra note 67, at 155.
69
MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, THE CASE AGAINST PATENTS 5–6 (2012).
70
See Joseph A. Yosick, Compulsory Patent Licensing for Efficient Use of Inventions, 2001 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1275, 1292 (2001).
71
Search results on file with author [hereinafter Geoengineering Patent Search]. The search used a
number of terms associated with climate engineering, including “aerosols,” “albedo,” “biochar,” “carbon,”
“capture,” “climate,” “cloud,” “geoengineering,” “global warming,” “inject,” “phytoplankton,” “pyrolysis,”
“radiation,” “sequestration,” “solar,” “storage,” and “stratospheric.” Then, the search results were reviewed
for relevance.
72
In this discussion, “applications” refers to applications submitted to the USPTO but not yet granted.
The USPTO, however, does not report information regarding patent applications received before 2001. See
Finding Pre-2001 Applied Not Granted Applications, STACKEXCHANGE, http://patents.stackexchange.com/
questions/3368/finding-pre-2001-applied-not-granted-applications (last visited Sept. 14, 2014).
Accordingly, this discussion does not incorporate application data from before that year.
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The number of climate-engineering patent applications and patents granted has
risen dramatically over the past five years. The following chart reflects the number of
geoengineering applications and patents since 1994:
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¶29

As the chart demonstrates, before 2008, the combined number of patent
applications and patents granted for geoengineering technologies did not exceed twenty
in a single year. However, the total exceeded forty in 2009, and eventually increased to
more than one hundred in 2013. Moreover, the rate at which the USPTO has granted
these patents has similarly increased. For instance, the USPTO never granted more than
ten such patents annually before 2010. Four years later, the annual number of
geoengineering patents granted increased nearly tenfold. In sum, both the number of
patents granted and applications filed illustrate startling growth over the past four years.73
¶30
CDR methods have dominated this recent growth, constituting more than 90% of
the geoengineering patents approved by the USPTO. Specifically, of the patents granted,
more than half (54%) concern carbon capture, and more than one-third (37%) involve
carbon sequestration.74 Particle-dispersion (4%) and solar-ray-reflection (2%) patents
73

A recently published review of climate-engineering patents found both similar and inconsistent results
to those found in our Geoengineering Patent Search. See Oldham et al., Mapping the Landscape of Climate
Engineering, 372 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y A, Nov. 17, 2014, at 1–20, available at
http://rsta.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/372/2031/20140065. They used fewer search terms, but they
performed their search over more databases (those of the USPTO, the European Patent Office, and the
Patent Cooperation Treaty). Id. at 3–4. They found that geoengineering patents peaked in 2007, but they
acknowledge that this may reflect a lack of data availability in some databases for recent years. Id. at 11.
These results conflict with their own findings regarding publications concerning geoengineering, which
they found “accelerated” after the publication of a seminal article by Paul Crutzen in 2006. Id. at 5 (citing
Paul J. Crutzen, Albedo Enhancement by Stratospheric Sulfur Injections: A Contribution to Resolve a
Policy Dilemma?, 77 CLIMATIC CHANGE 211, 211–12 (2006)); see infra note 89 (discussing the impact of
the Crutzen article).
74
Geoengineering Patent Search, supra note 71. Some patents, which this author categorized as carbon
sequestration, clearly identified inventions that involved burial, application, or use of captured carbon.
Other patents identified inventions that both captured carbon from a source and then provided for its
sequestration, which this author treated as carbon-capture patents. See id.
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commonly recur, with patents involving other various methods making up the difference
(3%).75
¶31
A review of these patents further reveals that many of these inventions are assigned
to only a few patent holders. Consequently, the future development of these technologies
is concentrated in the hands of a few.76 Only three inventors (or groups of inventors) are
credited with inventing five or more climate-engineering patents.77 Combined, these
parties have invented twenty-five (10%) of the patented technologies. However, many
geoengineering patents have been assigned to other parties, with 200 original patent
holders transferring ownership to 122 assignees.78 Eight of these assignees received five
or more patents. In total, these eight large patent holders were assigned fifty-six (23%)
recent geoengineering patents.79 And of these fifty-six assignments, only eight were
transferred to a non-corporate entity—the U.S. Department of Energy.
¶32
Although these assignments have resulted in concentrated ownership, they remain
spread across a number of different industries. A review of some of the largest patent
holders and the industries in which they operate shows the following industry distribution
for holders of 110 of these patents:
Renewable Energy
Universities
Manufacturing
Government
Oil
Chemical
¶33

35
29
13
13
12
8

Additionally, a characteristic that typifies many of these patents is the breadth of
their terms. For example, Patent 6,056,919 states:
A method of sequestering carbon dioxide in a deep open ocean
comprising the following steps:
(1) testing an area of the surface of a deep open ocean, in order to
confirm that at least a first nutrient is missing to a significant extent
from said area, and to identify said first missing nutrient, and
75

Id. The findings of the Oldham et al. search corroborated these general patterns. In their search, they
found that approximately 80% of geoengineering patents involved CDR. Oldham et al., supra note 73, at
11.
76
Common ownership of patents provides a useful indication of patent concentration, but more
meaningful approaches may be available. Daniel R. Cahoy notes that just counting patents fails to account
for the importance of foundational patents or integrated patent portfolios. No standard methodology exists,
however, for such analysis. Daniel R. Cahoy, Inverse Enclosure: Abdicating the Green Technology
Landscape, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 805, 846–47 (2012).
77
Geoengineering Patent Search, supra note 71; see Oldham et al., supra note 73, at 14 (finding
geoengineering patents to be held by small networks of inventors associated with particular companies and
also by a number of individuals).
78
Geoengineering Patent Search, supra note 71.
79
Another eight patents were assigned equally between Schlumburger Technology Corporation’s
Massachusetts and Texas affiliates. If they are treated as one entity, then nine parties control sixty-four
(26%) of the patents. Geoengineering Patent Search, supra note 71.
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(2) applying to said area a first fertilizer which comprises said first
missing nutrient, to fertilize said area with an appropriate amount of
said first missing nutrient whereby carbon dioxide is sequestered,
(3) limiting zooplankton and fish growth in said area by applying
said first fertilizer in pulses; and
(4) measuring the amount of sequestered carbon dioxide that results
from said fertilization of said area.80
Conceivably, the terms of this patent are broad enough to cover numerous processes.81
For instance, the patent claim does not identify the applicable testing procedures, the
extent of the area to be tested, the sought-after nutrients, the type of “fertilizer” used, or
the “pulses” that the procedure contemplates for applying the “fertilizer.” In fact, such a
broadly stated patent encompasses most ocean-fertilization methods while excluding few.
Similarly, granted in 2013, Patent 8,603,424 states in part:
Before the invention is described in greater detail, it is to be understood
that the invention is not limited to particular embodiments described
herein as such embodiments may vary. It is also to be understood that the
terminology used herein is for the purpose of describing particular
embodiments only, and is not intended to be limiting, since the scope of
the invention will be limited only by the appended claims.82
Thus, the USPTO granted a patent which by its own language specifically rejects any
limitations upon its terms. Discussed infra, overly broad patents create myriad issues.
¶34
A review of these patents also highlights the delay inherent to the application
process. On average, the USPTO has required nearly thirty-two months to approve a
climate-engineering patent.83 However, this average masks a wide range in processing
time. On the short end, the USPTO has awarded a patent within six months of the
application’s receipt.84 At the other extreme, the USPTO has required more than eighty
months on two separate occasions.85

80

U.S. Patent No. 6,056,919 (filed May 4, 1999).
See Shobita Parthasarathy et al., A Public Good? Geoengineering and Intellectual Property 5 (Sci.
Tech. & Pub. Policy Program, Working Paper No. 10-1, 2010), available at http://www.umt.edu/ethics/
ethicsgeoengineering/Workshop/articles1/Chris%20Avery.pdf.
82
U.S. Patent No. 8,603,424 (filed Oct. 11, 2012); see also Oldham et al., supra note 73, at 10 (noting
that geoengineering-patent claims “are often deliberately constructed in a broad way . . . to capture the
maximum range of possible uses of a claimed invention”).
83
Geoengineering Patent Search, supra note 71.
84
The inventor submitted his application (for using satellites to reflect solar energy to modify the earth’s
atmosphere) on October 8, 1999, and the USPTO granted it as Patent 6,045,089 on April 4, 2000. U.S.
Patent No. 6,045,089 (filed Oct. 8, 1999).
85
In the first instance, the inventors submitted their application (for a lime-based sorbent to capture
CO2) on November 14, 2003, and the USPTO granted it as Patent 7,879,139 on February 1, 2011. U.S.
Patent No. 7,879,139 (filed Nov. 14, 2003). In the second case, the inventor submitted his application (for a
process for removing CO2 from gaseous streams) on March 4, 2004, and the USPTO granted it as Patent
7,901,487 on March 8, 2011. U.S. Patent No. 7,901,487 (filed Mar. 4, 2004).
81
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The Current Patent System Exacerbates Geoengineering-Patent Issues

¶35

As the number of climate-engineering patents has accelerated, the risk that they
will impede access and future innovation has similarly increased. The granting of a large
number of broad, fundamental patents can create substantial barriers to subsequent
innovators.
¶36
While the number of patent applications and granted patents has increased
significantly in recent years,86 the corresponding rate of increase for geoengineering
patents has risen even more drastically. Indeed, climate engineering appears to be
undergoing a “patent land-grab.” This occurs when a lack of clarity in future technologies
encourages speculators to seek patents in developing fields, which in turn causes actual
inventors to file patent applications to avoid a competitive disadvantage.87 Coupled with
the increasing number of patent applications for related technologies, the lack of
geoengineering research makes the climate-engineering environment ripe for
opportunistic exploitation. Indeed, geoengineering is one of the few new fields (along
with nanotechnology) in nearly a century to experience substantial patenting at the
outset.88
¶37
In light of the early stage of climate-engineering research, this patent land-grab is
particularly pernicious. First, knowledge about geoengineering is in its infancy. Scientists
have contemplated climate engineering as a response to climate change for less than one
decade.89 Unsurprisingly, significant research into these methods has yet to commence.90
Second, and in part because of the novelty inherent to this technology, a number of
climate-engineering patents are poorly defined or overly broad.91 Consequently, holders
of some of these early geoengineering patents may control broad swaths of these
methods. This is normally a cause for concern because of the immense control patent
holders have over future inventions.92 Here, this disparity is especially troublesome

86

U.S. Patent Statistics Summary Table, Calendar Years 1963 to 2012, USPTO, http://www.uspto.gov/
web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm (last modified July 24, 2014, 6:22 PM).
87
Brian H. Lawrence, Clarifying Patent Law’s Role in Financial Service: Time to Settle the “Bill”ski?,
22 FED. CIR. B.J. 319, 341 n.180 (2012).
88
Mark A. Lemley, Patenting Nanotechnology, 58 STAN. L. REV. 601, 606 (2005). Professor Lemley
notes that the building blocks of several recent industries, such as computer hardware, software, the
Internet, and biotechnology, were “either unpatented, through mistake or because they were created by
government or university scientists with no interest in patents, or the patents presented no obstacle because
the government compelled licensing of the patents, or they were ultimately invalidated.” Id. In other fields,
including lasers, semiconductors, and polymer chemistry, “basic building-block patents did issue, but they
were delayed so long in interference proceedings that the industry developed in the absence of enforceable
patents.” Id. at 606–07.
89
See Wylie A. Carr et al., Public Engagement on Solar Radiation Management and Why It Needs to
Happen Now, 121 CLIMATIC CHANGE 567, 568 (2013). Although the concept of intentionally altering the
climate had been discussed previously, a 2006 article by Paul J. Crutzen, a Nobel Laureate, is credited with
triggering serious consideration of climate engineering as a response to climate change. Id.; see Crutzen,
supra note 73, at 211–12.
90
See Anthony E. Chavez, A Napoleonic Approach to Climate Change: The Geoengineering Branch, 5
WASH. & LEE J. CLIMATE & ENV’T 93, 123 (2014).
91
Parthasarathy et al., supra note 81, at 5.
92
See Amber Rose Stiles, Hacking Through the Thicket: A Proposed Patent Pooling Solution to the
Nanotechnology “Building Block” Patent Thicket Problem, 4 DREXEL L. REV. 555, 561–62 (2012).
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because it both deters future innovation and bestows control over technology with
potentially immeasurable societal value to only a few.93
The timing of patent land-grabs also creates unique problems. By their nature, land
grabs occur early in the development of a field. Because of this, applications often seek
building-block patents, which cover fundamental products and processes. Building-block
patents are therefore distinct “from incremental improvement patents, which have a much
narrower claim scope.”94
Awarding building-block patents, especially early in an industry’s development,
can frustrate the field’s growth. Patents for building-block technologies do not always
possess any marketable value of their own, but the inventions they cover can be crucial to
downstream development. Thus, patenting these inventions can slow industry
innovation.95 Moreover, overly broad patents exacerbate this problem. Broad patents
commonly arise at the confluence of several circumstances: a field is novel, standardized
terminology has not developed, patent examiners lack experience with and expertise in
the new technology, and applicants seek “to capture the largest possible grant of IP
protection with the claims of a single patent, leading applicants to draft claims that reach
too far.”96 As discussed previously, geoengineering patents share most of these
characteristics.
Making these adverse effects worse, the patent review process is inherently biased,
favoring approval of broad, building-block patents. When applications in new industries
are involved, an examiner may not be able to find an embodiment of the claimed
invention in prior art. In such circumstances, USPTO policy requires that the claim be
allowed, even if stated broadly.97 This is the case even where the examiner believes, but
cannot establish, that the claim exceeds the area actually explored.98
Broad initial patents can lock up technologies or retard development in a number of
ways.99 Overly broad patents prevent potential subsequent inventors from developing
new inventions derived from the original patent.100 Furthermore, they allow patent
holders to deny licenses, charge exorbitant royalties, or engage in delaying tactics, most
notably litigation.101 A related issue surfaces when patents are so broad that they overlap.
This widespread distribution of broad, overlapping patents causes various problems, such
as those stemming from “patent thickets” or “anticommons.”102

93

See Cressey, supra note 3.
John C. Miller & Drew L. Harris, The Carbon Nanotube Patent Landscape, 3 NANOTECHNOLOGY L.
& BUS. 427, 435 (2006).
95
See Stiles, supra note 92, at 561–62.
96
Id. at 563.
97
See Amit Makker, The Nanotechnology Patent Thicket and the Path to Commercialization, 84 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1163, 1182 (2011).
98
Id.
99
See Lemley, supra note 88, at 618–19.
100
See Samuel Reger, It’s Not So Obvious: How the Manifestly Evident Standard Affects Litigation
Costs by Reducing the Need for Claim Construction, 1 TEX. A&M L. REV. 729, 732 (2014).
101
See Nikola L. Datzov, The Machine-or-Transformation Patentability Test: The Reinvention of
Innovation, 33 HAMLINE L. REV. 281, 292 (2010) (explaining that innovators may avoid the market
because of fears of litigation).
102
Lemley, supra note 88, at 620.
94
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A patent thicket arises when patent rights extend more broadly than the actual
products claimed in a given field.103 A “dense web of overlapping intellectual property
rights” develops,104 and the resulting thicket “choke[s] out an industry.”105 A
geoengineering patent thicket may be especially dense because geoengineering endproducts likely incorporate components from many different patentable inventions. For
instance, an aerosol method might involve patents for the specific method (e.g., balloons,
hoses, etc.), the materials,106 the aerosol injector, and other aspects. Thus, each facet may
require different inventions patented by different inventors, further complicating the
thicket.107
¶43
A patent thicket can impede invention in a number of ways. Specifically, it usually
requires an inventor to incur additional costs to avoid infringement. While all hopeful
inventors must research whether their inventions infringe upon existing patents, and if so,
negotiate licenses108—the attendant costs of this process drastically increase when
numerous overlapping patents are involved.109 In this context, patents impede rather than
promote innovation.110
¶44
A related problem is that of a patent anticommons. The “tragedy of the
anticommons” is the mirror image of its better-known cousin.111 The problem of a
commons arises when too few exclusionary property rights result in exhaustion of a
resource.112 In the alternative, an anticommons occurs when too many persons have been
awarded exclusionary rights, causing a resource not to be fully utilized.113 Thus, the
anticommons involves “fragmented property rights, the aggregation of which is necessary
to make effective use of the property.”114 But the rights are not just fragmented; they are

103

Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1614 (2003).
Dana Beldiman, Patent Choke Points in the Influenza-Related Medicines Industry: Can Patent Pools
Provide Balanced Access?, 15 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 31, 46 (2012) (footnote omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
105
Burk & Lemley, supra note 103, at 1627.
106
Although the material commonly mentioned is sulfur, scientists are exploring alternative materials,
such as titanium dioxide, which has high reflectivity, well-researched safety, and significant availability.
Peter Davidson, Chris Burgoyne, Hugh Hunt & Matt Causier, Lifting Options for Stratospheric Aerosol
Geoengineering: Advantages of Tethered Balloon Systems, 370 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y A
4263, 4266 (2012).
107
Burk & Lemley, supra note 103, at 1628 (discussing patent thickets and the semiconductor industry).
Burk and Lemley and others point to semiconductors as an example of an end-product consisting of
different components covered by overlapping patents. They also involve cumulative technologies. For
semiconductors, cross licensing avoids patent interference. By contrast, in the chemical and pharmaceutical
industries, cross licensing primarily enables the exchange of technologies. DAVID J. TEECE, ESSAYS IN
TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT AND POLICY: SELECTED PAPERS OF DAVID J. TEECE 206 (2003).
108
Makker, supra note 97, at 1175.
109
See Stiles, supra note 92, at 559 (noting that overlapping building-block patents have deterred many
prospective inventors from proceeding with innovation plans).
110
See Burk & Lemley, supra note 103, at 1629.
111
D. Theodore Rave, Governing the Anticommons in Aggregate Litigation, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1183,
1190 (2013).
112
See Harry First, Controlling the Intellectual Property Grab: Protect Innovation, Not Innovators, 38
RUTGERS L.J. 365, 382–83 (2007).
113
Id. at 382; Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, SCIENCE, May 1, 1998, at 698.
114
Burk & Lemley, supra note 103, at 1611.
104
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dispersed among multiple owners. “Once an anticommons emerges, collecting rights into
usable private property is often brutal and slow.”115
¶45
Because of the diffusion of these rights, downstream inventors need to incur greater
costs to acquire licenses. These costs will include higher search fees, and more time and
money spent negotiating license fees.116 Furthermore, because innovators typically
cannot know in advance which rights will become necessary to produce their inventions,
they often must acquire more licenses than they actually need.117 Such expenses
essentially serve as a tax on further innovation.118 Consequently, in contrast to a
commons problem, the anticommons results in the underutilization of the property.119
Specifically, innovators are unable or unwilling (because of costs) to assemble the
assorted inventions to produce an innovative product.
¶46
Thickets and anticommons are similar yet distinct. Thickets involve horizontally
overlapping patents.120 Anticommons arise either horizontally with “different companies
hold[ing] rights at the same level of distribution,” or vertically with the final product
combining upstream and downstream components.121 Unlike a thicket, which results from
the distribution of broad patent rights, an anticommons requires the aggregation of a
multiplicity of patents controlled by numerous owners.122 Both, however, derive from the
excessive granting of patent rights. Moreover, an industry can suffer from both problems
concurrently.123
¶47
One last issue foretells problems for geoengineering innovation: delays in
processing patent applications. Timing, both at the beginning and end of the patent
system, can impair the development of geoengineering inventions. Delays in processing
patent applications slow the rate of innovation.124 On average, patent applications require
more than two years to process, extending up to six years in many instances.125 The
USPTO has required an even longer period to grant geoengineering patents.126 Since the
twenty-year exclusion period usually commences upon the filing of the patent
115
Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 113, at 698. In eBay Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C., the Supreme Court
held that a plaintiff in a patent enforcement action must establish that monetary damages would not be
adequate to compensate for its injury before receiving the relief of a permanent injunction. 547 U.S. 388,
391–92 (2006). Nevertheless, decisions of the Federal Circuit may limit the ability of this decision to
prevent patent holdups. DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS
CAN SOLVE IT 30 (2009) (noting that a Federal Circuit decision allowing patentees to obtain up to fiftytimes actual damages may effectively serve as an injunction).
116
See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 113, at 700.
117
See First, supra note 112, at 382.
118
Id. This assumes that these negotiations proceed relatively smoothly. In some instances, patent
owners refuse to license their inventions, id., or become holdouts, agreeing to license only if they receive
excessive licenses. Burk & Lemley, supra note 103, at 1611.
119
Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, 1
INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 119, 124 (2000).
120
Burk & Lemley, supra note 103, at 1614.
121
Id. at 1612–13.
122
See id. at 1613.
123
See Beldiman, supra note 104, at 47 (noting the presence of both thickets and anticommons in the
influenza-related medicines market).
124
“Patent backlogs hinder the deployment of innovation and have clear adverse effects on the global
economy.” USPTO and UKIPO Announce Action Plan to Reduce Global Patent Backlogs, USPTO (Mar.
10, 2010), http://www.uspto.gov/news/pr/2010/10_09.jsp.
125
See Patent Time Frame: How Long Does It Take to Get a Patent?, supra note 56.
126
See Winckel, supra note 58, at 1018 n.13.
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application, a processing delay reduces both the value of the patent to the inventor and
the availability of the invention to innovators.127
¶48
At the back end, the twenty-year exclusion period also impedes the development of
climate-engineering inventions. Climate-engineering systems remain in their infancy,
with scientists having conducted only limited research on these methods.128
Consequently, most methods will likely require a decade or more of computer analysis
and field-testing before they are ready for implementation.129 Limiting access to
geoengineering technologies only further delays the development of the underlying
methodologies.130
IV. SEVERAL APPROACHES MIGHT HELP REDUCE THE PROBLEMS CAUSED BY THE
PATENTING OF GEOENGINEERING INVENTIONS
¶49

Despite the various issues arising from the patenting of climate-engineering
inventions, several possible solutions—or combinations of solutions—can help minimize
these concerns. This section reviews and analyzes prior approaches and considers their
appropriateness for climate-engineering patents. Before exploring these strategies,
however, this section identifies some aspects of geoengineering that policymakers must
consider when modifying the patent system to address these inventions.
A.

Several Considerations Apply Uniquely to Geoengineering Patents

¶50

While geoengineering patents are new, many of the aforementioned issues are
anything but. Previous problems inspire solutions that are useful here, but no single
approach provides a perfect or complete answer. Thus, to best place these approaches in
their appropriate context, proper analysis must begin with the considerations that apply
uniquely to climate-engineering patents.
¶51
First, time is essential. With the planet’s climate approaching a tipping point,131 and
the vast amount of time required to develop and implement geoengineering methods,132
one could argue that humankind is already out of time. Certainly, any further delay will
make research, development, and implementation even more urgent.
¶52
Second, the eventual end-user is likely to be a governmental body, such as the U.S.
government or a similar multinational entity.133 This has several implications for the
127

See Tran, supra note 66, at 520.
ROYAL SOC’Y, supra note 34, at 52.
129
See Timothy A. Fox & Lee Chapman, Review: Engineering Geo-Engineering, 18 METEOROLOGICAL
APPLICATIONS 1, 6 (2011).
130
See Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Patent System and Climate Change, 16 VA. J.L. & TECH. 301, 338 (2011)
(noting that patent protection may delay climate-change-related discoveries and their development).
131
Based upon the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report, a tipping point may be only twenty-five years
away. Barboza, supra note 8. Holding global warming to an increase of less than 2°C, on the other hand,
may soon be impossible within half of that time. Stockey, supra note 19, at 281.
132
See Fox & Chapman, supra note 129, at 6.
133
Because of the global consequences of implementing geoengineering, we can anticipate that
international agreements will eventually govern its implementation, if not also its testing. KELSI BRACMORT
& RICHARD K. LATTANZIO, GEOENGINEERING: GOVERNANCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY 29 (2013).
Moreover, such agreements are likely to impose moratoriums on implementation absent international
consent. For instance, the parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity have already imposed such a
moratorium. Chavez, supra note 90, at 146–47. Thus, because of these considerations, the “consumer” of
128
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patent system. For instance, if necessary, the U.S. government will be more likely to use
whatever means required to break any patent logjams, which it has done previously, most
notably during World War I.134 Active governmental involvement is foreseeable if patent
holders unreasonably withhold access to essential patents. Additionally, with a
government as the primary consumer, regular market forces will exercise less force.
¶53
In sum, geoengineering is in its infancy. Most of these methods are still at the
conceptual or research stages,135 and few field-tests have been proposed.136 The
development of new methods, the involvement of new players, and the invention of new
devices are likely to cause drastic change in the geoengineering field. Accordingly,
flexibility will be an important component of any application review process.
B.

The USPTO Can Reduce the Number or Limit the Scope of Climate-Engineering
Patents Already Granted

¶54

Patent thickets and anticommons both result from over-patenting. The USPTO has
several tools at its disposal to address these problems. For instance, it can limit the
number or scope of certain patents or simply block overly broad patent applications. At
the extreme end of the spectrum, the USPTO could independently deny all climateengineering patent applications, or alternatively, Congress could prohibit the patenting of
these inventions, both achieving the same result. And concerning patents already
awarded, the USPTO can exercise its reexamination power, possibly limiting or revoking
such patents where appropriate. Nevertheless, as an industry develops, one assumes the
USPTO imposes stricter standards, perhaps even limiting the number of patents annually
awarded in a newly established field.137 If recent trends are indicative,138 however, the
USPTO’s permissive practices might endure longer than expected.
¶55
Alternatively, Congress could force a resolution by prohibiting patents of climateengineering inventions. While this approach might seem drastic, the U.S. government has
taken similar measures before to protect the public interest. For instance, federal law
currently prohibits patents for inventions relating to national security139 or atomic
energy.140 Pursuant to these statutes, if the Commissioner of Patents concludes that an

climate-engineering products will likely be an intergovernmental agency. See also Paul Nightingale & Rose
Cairns, The Security Implications of Geoengineering: Blame, Imposed Agreement and the Security of
Critical Infrastructure 9–10 (CGG Working Papers, Paper No. 18, 2014), available at http://www.climateengineering.eu/single/items/nightingale-paul-cairns-rose-c-2014-the-security-implications-ofgeoengineering-blame-imposed-agreement-and-the-security-of-crit.html (arguing that, because of security
concerns, SRM technologies would likely be operated by the military).
134
See Mfrs. Aircraft Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 77 Ct. Cl. 481, 488 (Ct. Cl. 1933) (noting that the
U.S. government threatened to condemn aviation patents to facilitate airplane manufacturing).
135
BRACMORT & LATTANZIO, supra note 133, at i.
136
The recent Stratospheric Particle Injection for Climate Engineering (SPICE) Project was “one of the
first large SRM research projects anywhere in the world, and the first to propose an outdoor experiment.”
Jack Stilgoe, Matthew Watson & Kirsty Kuo, Public Engagement with Biotechnologies Offers Lessons for
the Governance of Geoengineering Research and Beyond, PLOS BIOLOGY, Nov. 2013, at 1, 2. The
experimenters cancelled the field-test over a patent dispute. Cressey, supra note 3, at 429.
137
See Burk & Lemley, supra note 103, at 1613.
138
See U.S. Patent Statistics Chart, Calendar Years 1963–2012, USPTO, http://www.uspto.gov/web/
offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm (last visited Sept. 14, 2014).
139
35 U.S.C. § 181 (2012).
140
42 U.S.C. § 2181 (2012).
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application might involve such technologies, then she must submit the application to the
appropriate agency for review.141 If the agency concludes that the application implicates
these concerns, then the USPTO withholds the patent.142 The applicant, however, is
entitled to reasonable compensation,143 determined by the Patent Compensation Board.144
The Atomic Energy Act similarly bars patents for inventions that are “useful solely in the
utilization of special nuclear material or atomic energy in an atomic weapon.”145
¶56
Climate change has national security implications.146 Because of the risks inherent
in several geoengineering methods,147 many are unlikely to be used except in the event of
a climate emergency. Thus, premising a reduction or even prohibition of climateengineering patents upon national security concerns could be justified. Furthermore, by
definition, a prohibition on such patents would prevent the problems of thickets and
anticommons from worsening, and remove barriers to future inventions.148
¶57
Nevertheless, the disadvantages of such a ban outweigh its benefits. The outright
prohibition of patents and their corresponding exclusivity rights would likely discourage
research and investment in a fledgling field.149 And given that these inventions will likely
have geoengineering and non-geoengineering uses,150 an inventor may circumvent this
limitation by seeking patent protection for its other uses, while keeping silent about the
climate-engineering aspects of the invention. Furthermore, prohibiting or denying patents
for future inventions will not resolve the problems associated with current patents,
specifically the difficulty of identifying and tracking geoengineering inventions and
securing rights to the use thereof.
¶58
Congress adopted a slightly different approach for inventions related to the space
program. Inventions pertaining to space activities developed during employment or under
contract for the U.S. government became the exclusive property of the United States,151
ensuring that such inventions were available for this national purpose. Climate
141

See 35 U.S.C. § 181. Specifically, the Commissioner shall provide the patent to the Atomic Energy
Commission, the Secretary of Defense, and the chief officer of any other department or agency designated
by the President as a defense agency of the United States. Id.
142
S. Scott Pershern, Taking Inventors’ Lunch Money: Provide Incentives for Sensitive Technology
Research Under the Patriot Act, 29 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 697, 702 (2007).
143
35 U.S.C. § 183 (2012).
144
42 U.S.C. § 2187.
145
42 U.S.C. § 2181(a).
146
See CNA CORP., NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE THREAT OF CLIMATE CHANGE 6 (2007). Among these
concerns are food and water security, famine and food scarcity, health security, disruptive migration events,
political instability, and international conflict. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ABRUPT IMPACTS OF CLIMATE
CHANGE: ANTICIPATING SURPRISES 146 (2013).
147
For instance, most aerosol-based SRM methods would alter the globe’s precipitation patterns. John
Latham et al., Marine Cloud Brightening, 370 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y A 4217, 4223 (2012). If
SRM does cool the planet, the system could be turned off but only at a price—scientists have determined
that the climate would return to its pre-cooled temperature, but the temperature would rise at such a rapid
rate that it might endanger many species. Kelly E. McCusker et al., Rapid and Extensive Warming
Following Cessation of Solar Radiation Management, 9 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 24005, 24005 (2014).
Similarly, CDR methods also involve risk. For example, stored carbon could escape and reenter the
atmosphere. Bob van der Zwaan & Koen Smekens, CO2 Capture and Storage with Leakage in an EnergyClimate Model, 14 ENV’T MODEL ASSESS. 135, 135 (2009).
148
See Beldiman, supra note 104, at 49.
149
See also id.
150
See infra Part V.B.
151
42 U.S.C. § 2457(a) (2006) (repealed 2010).
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engineering not only shares many parallels with the space program, such as governmental
involvement and national (indeed, global) benefit,152 but also is more urgent. Thus, a
comparable provision asserting exclusive government control of such inventions, joined
with broad or open licensing practices, could help eliminate the problems of thickets and
anticommons. While this might be helpful, in light of the wide range of private industries
currently involved in geoengineering research,153 this restriction would likely have
limited impact.
¶59
Alternatively, the USPTO could reexamine and, where appropriate, revoke or
narrow previously issued patents. The Patent Statute authorizes any person at any time to
file a request to reexamine any patent on the basis of prior art.154 Further, the America
Invents Act (AIA) provides two new procedures for third parties to request patent
review.155 The first procedure—post-grant review—enables a third party to challenge a
patent on any ground of patentability within nine months of the granting of the patent.156
After this nine-month period (or resolution of a post-grant review), the second procedure,
called inter partes examination, allows anyone to request that one or more claims of a
patent be deemed unpatentable.157 But despite these improvements, the new procedures
likely provide inadequate remedies because filing for a patent reexamination is labor
intensive and expensive.158 Simply stated, relying upon prospective inventors to reduce
the thicket in this manner seems both misplaced and unrealistic.
¶60
Perhaps more promising, the USPTO Director also possesses the power to initiate
reexamination of a patent, either after request or upon the Director’s own initiative.159 A
Director, however, rarely issues an order to commence reexamination.160 That said, one
of the few instances of director-initiated reexamination addressed an analogous trend of
granting overly broad patents in a fledgling and complex field. For an entire decade, the
USPTO had denied all software patent applications. But in 1981, in Diamond v. Diehr,
the Supreme Court held that software was patentable.161 As a result, and in part because
of a lack of examiners possessing the necessary expertise, the USPTO began granting
excessively broad software patents. After receiving much criticism for these broad
patents, the Director initiated a reexamination, and ultimately, the agency rescinded
dozens of these patents.162
152

See BRACMORT & LATTANZIO, supra note 133, at 36 (noting that because engineering the climate
system is a global activity with trans-boundary effects, some suggest that only a multilateral body is
appropriate in addressing it).
153
Geoengineering Patent Search, supra note 71.
154
35 U.S.C. § 302 (2012).
155
Lanning, supra note 50, at 403.
156
Id.
157
35 U.S.C. § 311(b) (2012).
158
See Stiles, supra note 92, at 570. While one analysis found reexamination costs total approximately
one-tenth of the cost of litigation, they still could range as high as $100,000. Additional drawbacks are a
limited role for the challenger during the reexamination process and probable juror bias against a party
whose reexamination request failed. Stuart J. H. Graham et al., Patent Quality Control: A Comparison of
U.S. Patent Reexaminations and European Patent Oppositions, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED
ECONOMY: PROCEEDINGS OF THE SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMIC POLICY BOARD 8 (Wesley M.
Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w8807.
159
35 U.S.C. § 303(a) (2012).
160
See 37 C.F.R. § 1.520 (2012).
161
450 U.S. 175, 185–86 (1981).
162
See Lori B. Andrews, Genes and Patent Policy: Rethinking Intellectual Property Rights, 3 NATURE
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Finally, and serving as the most extreme alternative procedure, Congress can
simply revoke all geoengineering patents, as it did when enacting the Atomic Energy Act
(AEA). Congress passed the AEA to provide for government control of the possession,
use, and production of atomic energy and special nuclear material, and to encourage
widespread participation in the development and utilization of atomic energy for peaceful
purposes.163 To these ends, the law “revoked all existing patents useful exclusively in the
production of fissionable materials.”164 While revocation, or “patent breaking,” would
help reduce the number and breadth of climate-engineering patents, most commentators
consider it an unpalatable option used only in dire circumstances.165 For this reason,
compensation is available for any patent revoked under these provisions.166 In view of
these considerations, namely the significant resources required and limited deterrent
value for future patent applications, patent breaking probably provides only a remedy of
last resort for dealing with these issues.
C.

Compulsory Licenses Can Ensure Access to These Inventions

¶62

A similar yet less extreme option often suggested by commentators to improve
access to patents is compulsory licensing. A compulsory license “compels a patent owner
to allow certain others to practice the invention otherwise protected by a patent.”167 The
government effectively steps into the shoes of the patent holder to grant a license to a
government agency or third party. Usually, the patentee receives compensation for the
compelled license.168
¶63
The primary benefit of compulsory licenses is that they allow widespread access to
inventions to facilitate further innovation.169 Specifically, compulsory licensing can be
critical when the market has failed to disseminate inventions. This occurs when the patent
owner exercises its monopoly power but chooses not to practice the invention or charges
unreasonable prices for a license.170 Therefore, many argue that compulsory licensing
may mitigate patent thickets171 and anticommons,172 both of which impair future
inventors’ attempts to acquire the necessary licenses to continue innovation. Given that

REVS. GENETICS 803, 805 (2002).
163
42 U.S.C. § 2013 (2012). The legislative history of the Atomic Energy Act indicates that Congress
concluded that the processing and use of fissionable material must be regulated to promote the national
interest and to protect public health and safety. Michael Moulton, Effecting the Impossible: An Argument
Against Tax Strategy Patents, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 631, 665 (2008).
164
N.V. Philips’ Gloeilampenfabrieken v. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 316 F.2d 401, 405 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
165
See Andrew W. Torrance, Patents to the Rescue: Disasters and Patent Law, 10 DEPAUL J. HEALTH
CARE L. 309, 341 (2007) [hereinafter Torrance, Patents to the Rescue].
166
Id.
167
Id. at 336.
168
Id.
169
See Simone A. Rose, On Purple Pills, Stem Cells, and Other Market Failures: A Case for a Limited
Compulsory Licensing Scheme for Patent Property, 48 HOW. L.J. 579, 619 (2005).
170
See Mandel, supra note 55, at 59.
171
See, e.g., Richard Bis, Financing Innovation: A Project Finance Approach to Funding Patentable
Innovation, 21 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 14, 20 (2009).
172
See, e.g., Richard Li-dar Wang, Biomedical Upstream Patenting and Scientific Research: The Case
for Compulsory Licenses Bearing Reach-Through Royalties, 10 YALE J.L. & TECH. 251 (2008).
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these licenses are especially appropriate when the underlying invention has significant
social value, at first blush, compulsory licensing appears to offer a possible solution.173
Yet the U.S. patent system generally disfavors compulsory licenses. As the
Supreme Court recognized, “Compulsory licensing is a rarity in our patent system.”174 A
broad grant of compulsory licenses has generally received a frigid reception from
domestic parties, with U.S. courts and many commentators often “hostile to the very
concept of compulsory licensing.”175 And although courts recognize compulsory
licensing as a solution for antitrust violations,176 it is considered a remedy of last resort.177
On only a few occasions, and none recently, courts have imposed compulsory
licenses.178 In one case, the Second Circuit found a compulsory license appropriate
primarily because the patent owner was not using the license to manufacture a product.179
Subsequent decisions of the Federal Circuit, however, indicate that it is unlikely to award
compulsory licenses in the future.180 Indeed, the Federal Circuit consistently posits that
broad protection of patent rights conforms to public policy.181
Despite this resistance, the use of compulsory licenses to resolve legal disputes has
spawned some significant successes; the most prominent examples of which occurred
over a half-century ago. In 1956, the United States entered into consent decrees with
American Telegraph & Telephone (AT&T) and International Business Machines (IBM)
concerning their patents. The agreement with AT&T required that it license at reasonable
royalties all patents controlled by a subsidiary, Bell Systems.182 Similarly, the IBM
decree required that it grant nonexclusive, nontransferable licenses for all of its patents to
any applicant at reasonable royalties. Accordingly, the applicant was obligated to cross
license its patents to IBM on similar terms.183 While some originally opposed this
government involvement, in hindsight, the combined licensing of these patent portfolios
is widely recognized for fostering the rapid growth of the semiconductor industry.184
Nevertheless, Congress has repeatedly rejected invitations to enact a broad
compulsory license statute. While the Patent Act does not contain a general compulsory

173

Rose, supra note 169, at 621–22.
Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215 (1980).
175
Kimberly M. Thomas, Protecting Academic and Non-Profit Research: Creating a Compulsory
Licensing Provision in the Absence of an Experimental Use Exception, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH. L.J. 347, 356 (2007). Indeed, a congressional representative once charged that compulsory
licenses are both unconstitutional and un-American. Stefan A. Risenfeld, Compulsory Licenses and United
States Industrial and Artistic Property Law, 47 CAL. L. REV. 51, 51–52 (1959).
176
See United States v. Glaxo Grp. Ltd., 410 U.S. 52, 71 n.5 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
177
See Carol M. Nielsen & Michael R. Samardzjia, Compulsory Patent Licensing: Is It a Viable
Solution in the United States?, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 509, 535–36 (2007).
178
See Yosick, supra note 70, at 1281.
179
Foster v. Am. Mach. & Foundry Co., 492 F.2d 1317, 1324 (2d Cir. 1974).
180
See Yosick, supra note 70, at 1281.
181
See Smith Int’l., Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (granting a
preliminary injunction against infringement as consistent with the public policy underlying the patent
laws).
182
TEECE, supra note 107, at 209.
183
Id. at 211.
184
See id. at 212–13. IBM noted that this relatively open licensing helped accelerate the pace of
innovation because it facilitated the work of others and access to their results. In fact, IBM considered
access to others’ patents to be more valuable than the royalties it could have earned on the licensing of its
9,000 patents. Id. at 212.
174
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licensing provision,185 during its 1952 revision of U.S. patent law, Congress considered
incorporating a compulsory licensing provision. However, after vehement opposition, it
excluded this provision from the final bill.186 A few years later, Congress reconsidered
adding the provision, but again rejected it.187 Subsequent efforts to amend the Patent Act
to allow compulsory licensing for public health purposes or special circumstances have
also failed.188 With opposition still salient, the United States remains one of the few
countries without a general compulsory license provision.189
¶68
Nevertheless, in certain limited circumstances, inapplicable to the vast majority of
patents,190 Congress has provided for the imposition of compulsory licenses.191 The most
noteworthy examples, touched on before and discussed below, are the Atomic Energy
Act and Clean Air Act. Other instances of limited compulsory licensing are found in the
Tennessee Valley Authority Act (granting compulsory licenses for inventions related to
fertilizer or hydroelectric power),192 the Plant Protection Act (granting compulsory
licenses when necessary to provide an adequate supply of fiber, food, or feed),193 and the
Semiconductor Chip Protection Act (granting innocent purchaser of an infringing chip
the right to pay a reasonable royalty).194
¶69
The Atomic Energy Act (AEA) provides a form of compulsory license. Upon
receipt of an application to practice a license, the Atomic Energy Commission will
conduct a hearing to determine whether the patent implicates the public interest.195 That
is, the public interest must be of primary importance to the utilization of fissionable
material to effectuate the purposes of the AEA.196 Where the public-interest inquiry has
been satisfied, the Commission may grant a nonexclusive license197 to either the
government or a person seeking a license.198 If a person applies for a license, the
applicant must demonstrate that he cannot receive a license from the patent holder for a

185

Chui, supra note 49, at 462.
See Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215 n.21 (1980).
187
Andrew W. Torrance, Patent Law, Hippo, and the Biodiversity Crisis, 9 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL.
PROP. L. 624, 648 (2010).
188
Rose, supra note 169, at 621. Congress rejected compulsory license provisions in other legislation,
including the 1973 Hart Bill and the 1999 Affordable Prescription Drugs Act. Yosick, supra note 70, at
1278. The Hart Bill would have permitted compulsory licenses of patents related to “public health, safety,
or protection of the environment” or for patents that are unused. Id. The Affordable Prescription Drugs Act
would have required compulsory licenses of patents relating to human health under certain circumstances.
Id.
189
See Kenneth J. Nunnenkamp, Compulsory Licensing of Critical Patents Under CERCLA?, 9 J. NAT.
RES. & ENVTL. L. 397, 404 (1994).
190
See id.
191
Despite their relative rarity in U.S. patent law, compulsory licenses are actually commonplace under
U.S. copyright law. See Jorge L. Contreras, Standards, Patents, and the National Smart Grid, 32 PACE L.
REV. 641, 672 (2012).
192
16 U.S.C. § 831 (2012).
193
7 U.S.C. § 2404 (2012).
194
17 U.S.C. § 901(a) (2012).
195
42 U.S.C. § 2183(d) (2012).
196
42 U.S.C. § 2183(a).
197
42 U.S.C. § 2183(b).
198
Id.
186
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reasonable amount.199 The AEA correspondingly mandates that patent owners receive
reasonable royalties from licensees.200
¶70
Congress similarly included a compulsory license provision in the Clean Air Act
(CAA), which places the primary responsibility for air-pollution prevention and control
on the states.201 The CAA seeks to improve air quality through the implementation of a
regulatory scheme designed to stimulate private development of air-pollution-control
technology.202 Because of the importance of access to these technologies, Congress
included a means for states to acquire compulsory licenses to technologies necessary to
achieve federally mandated air-quality standards.203 If the state can satisfy a set of
requirements,204 then the U.S. Attorney General certifies the application to a district
court, which may order the patentee to license the invention upon reasonable terms.205
While states have yet to employ this provision, one commentator suggests that its
presence may have persuaded parties to negotiate agreements they might not otherwise
have reached.206
¶71
The U.S. government has also reserved the right to a compulsory license for any
U.S. patent.207 When the United States uses or manufactures (or contracts with a party to
do so) an invention protected by a U.S. patent, it acts not as an ordinary infringer but as a
compulsory, nonexclusive licensee.208 Congress enacted this law to enable the federal
government to purchase goods necessary to its performance without the threat of having
the supplier enjoined from selling patented goods to the U.S. government.209 The United
States’ right to compel a license applies broadly, and the federal government exercises
this right frequently.210
¶72
Additionally, although Congress has not approved a general compulsory license
provision, it did provide the federal government broad licensing rights for governmentfunded inventions. In 1980, Congress passed the Bayh-Dole Act (BDA), which amended
the patent code.211 Prior to the passage of the BDA, the USPTO received very few
applications for federally funded inventions, the majority of which remained in the hands
199

42 U.S.C. § 2183(e)(4).
42 U.S.C. § 2183(g).
201
42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(3) (2012).
202
See Warren F. Schwartz, Mandatory Patent Licensing of Air Pollution Control Technology, 57 VA.
L. REV. 719, 719 (1971).
203
Torrance, supra note 187, at 648–49.
204
The Clean Air Act requires a party to satisfy three requirements to obtain a license. First, the patented
technology is not “reasonably available” yet “necessary” to comply with an air-quality standard; second,
“no reasonable alternative methods” exist; and third, the unavailability of such technology may cause a
“substantial lessening of competition.” 42 U.S.C. § 7608 (2012).
205
Id. Congress approved § 7608 with little controversy in 1970, Nunnenkamp, supra note 189, at 405–
06, but an effort arose subsequently to repeal the provision. Id. at 406 n.39. Nevertheless, by 1977, when
Congress “completely revised” the Clean Air Act, the provision remained. Id. at 406.
206
Yosick, supra note 70, at 1279.
207
See 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2012).
208
See Motorola, Inc. v. United States., 729 F.2d 765, 768 (Fed. Cir. 1984). The statute entitles the
patent holder to a reasonable royalty. 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a). Because the government has the right to use
patented inventions for the public good, infringement by the government is treated as an exercise of
eminent domain, rather than tortious conduct, as would be the case with private litigants. B.E. Meyers &
Co. v. United States, 47 Fed. Cl. 375, 380 (2000).
209
See Coakwell v. United States, 372 F.2d 508, 511 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
210
See Nunnenkamp, supra note 189, at 403.
211
Thomas, supra note 175, at 365.
200
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of educational institutions.212 Congress approved the BDA to promote the utilization of
inventions arising from federally funded research, to encourage small businesses’
participation in federally funded research, and to foster the collaboration of profit and
nonprofit interests, especially universities.213 The BDA accomplished these goals by
allowing universities to retain title to federally funded inventions.214
¶73
This transfer of rights had a profound effect. Since 1980, the number of patents
generated by domestic universities has increased tenfold.215 Additionally, university
income from licensing increased from $7.3 million in 1981 to $3.4 billion in 2008.216 Yet
universities were not the only benefactors. In exchange for allowing universities to retain
title to their inventions, the BDA establishes “march-in rights” for federal agencies that
fund these patented inventions. And because march-in rights allow funding agencies to
grant licenses to qualified third parties,217 the private sector benefits as well. In essence,
the BDA establishes compulsory licenses for those inventions that arise from federal
funding.218
¶74
Further, the U.S. government may exercise its march-in rights, inter alia, to
alleviate health or safety needs.219 These rights, however, appear not to have been
exercised in the three decades since Congress passed the law.220 Joshua Sarnoff suggests
that the refusal to exercise these rights demonstrates their highly controversial nature,
specifically in that they function as “ex post regulatory compulsory license[s].”221 Again,
American antipathy to compulsory licensing proves persistent.

212

Terry K. Tullis, Comment, Application of the Government License Defense to Federally Funded
Nanotechnology Research: The Case for a Limited Patent Compulsory Licensing Regime, 53 UCLA L.
REV. 279, 303–04 (2005). At the time, the government funded 60% of all academic research. Innovation’s
Golden Goose, ECONOMIST (Dec. 12, 2002), http://www.economist.com/node/1476653. Despite this
investment, only 5% of federally funded inventions led to commercial applications. Tullis, supra at 304
n.97.
213
See 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2012).
214
35 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2012). The United States also retains a royalty-free license for it or any of its
contractors to practice the invention. Id. § 202(c)(4).
215
Id. § 202(a).
216
See Vicki Loise & Ashley J. Stevens, The Bayh-Dole Act Turns 30, 45 LES NOUVELLES 185, 188
(2010).
217
35 U.S.C. § 203(a) (2012).
218
Thomas, supra note 175, at 366.
219
35 U.S.C. § 203(a)(2). Additional circumstances include overcoming a failure to apply the invention,
§ 203(a)(1), meeting requirements of federal regulations for public use, § 203(a)(3), or addressing a breach
of the agreement, § 203(a)(4). Administrative and federal court appeals processes further restrict these
rights for adversely affected inventors and licensees. § 203(b).
220
As of 1997, the United States had never utilized its march-in rights. Mary Eberle, March-In Rights
Under the Bayh-Dole Act: Public Access to Federally Funded Research, 3 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV.
155, 160 n.38 (1999). For instance, as of 2012, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) had yet to grant a
petition for a license. Kevin E. Noonan, Groups Petition for NIH Exercise of March-In Rights over Abbott
Laboratories’ Norvir®, PATENT DOCS (Oct. 31, 2012), http://www.patentdocs.org/2012/11/groups-petitionfor-nih-exercise-of-march-in-rights-over-abbott-laboratories-norvir.html.
221
Sarnoff, supra note 130, at 355. Mr. Sarnoff believes that this resistance could be alleviated through
greater clarity concerning the criteria and circumstances giving rise to the exercise of march-in rights. Id. A
related approach that might better encourage the extension of licenses comes from California. In 2004, the
Golden State’s voters approved the California Stem Cell Research and Cures Initiative. Andrew T. Serafini
& Gene H. Yee, IP Provisions and ROI for State-Funded Stem-Cell-Based Products and Technologies in
California, 24 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 3, 3 (2012). It requires grantee organizations to negotiate nonexclusive licenses of funded inventions “whenever possible.” CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 100306(b) (2014).
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International agreements and laws, on the other hand, typically support compulsory
licenses dating back to the 1873 Vienna Congress.222 Currently, for example, the TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (TRIPS) identifies several
grounds for granting compulsory licenses, such as in response to national emergencies,
anticompetitive practices, or unavailable necessary medicine.223 Further, both the Paris
Convention and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) also provide for
the exercise of such licenses.224 Many nations have enacted compulsory license laws as
well. For instance, when the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) surveyed
its member states concerning their compulsory licensing provisions, twenty-two countries
responded that they allow compulsory licenses for national or public interests,225 while
twelve countries responded that they provide such licenses for public health reasons.226
¶76
However, even countries with compulsory licensing provisions rarely implement
227
them. More commonly, governments threaten to utilize their licenses, thus coercing
patent holders to either grant licenses or make the products available at substantially
lower prices. For instance, in 2001, Brazil announced its intent to grant a compulsory
license to produce Nelfinavir, a retroviral drug used in the treatment of AIDS.228 Brazil
planned to act under the “national emergency” provision of its patent law, which mirrors
Article 31 of TRIPS.229 Less than two weeks after Brazil’s announcement, Hoffman-La
Roche reduced the price of the drug by 40%.230 Thus, the true benefit of compulsory
licenses may stem from the threat of potential licensing rather than the actual grant
thereof, inspiring patent holders and potential licensees to negotiate agreements.231 While
governments have used compulsory licensing infrequently, many proponents identify the
coercive nonuse of compulsory licensing as its primary benefit. Referred to as a “wings
effect,”232 the mere ability of the government to compel licenses can encourage patent
holders and inventors to negotiate acceptable terms rather than risk governmental
intervention.233
¶77
Yet notwithstanding their realistically benign influence, critics attack compulsory
licenses on several grounds.234 The primary criticism has been that these licenses reduce
222

Thomas, supra note 175, at 359.
Id.
224
Torrance, supra note 187, at 648.
225
Included within this category are national security, national defense, considerable public interests,
protection of natural environment, etc. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., SURVEY ON COMPULSORY
LICENSES GRANTED BY WIPO MEMBER STATES TO ADDRESS ANTI-COMPETITIVE USES OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS 7 (2011). The twenty-two countries were Algeria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, the Czech
Republic, Finland, Ireland, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Lithuania, Nicaragua, Norway, Oman, Panama, Poland,
Spain, Sweden, Trinidad and Tobago, the United Kingdom, Ukraine, Uruguay, and Uzbekistan. Id.
226
Id. These countries are Belgium, France, Hungary, Kenya, Mexico, Lithuania, Oman, Panama,
Poland, Trinidad and Tobago, and Ukraine. Id.
227
See Yosick, supra note 70, at 1294.
228
See Jason D. Ferrone, Compulsory Licensing During Public Health Crises: Bioterrorism’s Mark on
Global Pharmaceutical Patent Protection, 26 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 385, 402 (2003).
229
Id. at 402–03.
230
Alex Bellos, Roche Bows to Brazil on AIDS Drug, THE GUARDIAN, Sept. 1, 2001.
231
Thomas, supra note 175, at 357–58.
232
Rose, supra note 169, at 622.
233
Id.
234
At one extreme, critics charge that compulsory licenses represent “socialism in disguise.” Rose,
supra note 169, at 623.
223
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incentives to invent because they diminish the value of inventions by eliminating
inventors’ opportunities to exercise monopoly pricing. The resulting lower return lessens
the main incentive to invent.235 Moreover, fearing this potential loss of value, many
inventors might avoid patenting their inventions, thus inhibiting the beneficial disclosure
that an application requires.236 Finally, the reduced prices resulting from compulsory
licenses would discourage research investment, further hindering opportunities for
innovation.237 In other words, critics argue that compulsory licenses could undermine the
primary objectives of the patent system.238
¶78
Critics also charge that compulsory licenses reduce competition.239 Although
theoretically possible, the actual use of these licenses has avoided this consequence. As
noted previously, the U.S. government tends to use compulsory licenses sparingly, if at
all.240 Further, some commentators suggest that compulsory licenses should only be used
in circumstances where the patent owner is either not licensing the invention entirely or
only in a limited manner.241 Thus, under current practices, any anticompetitive impact
would likely be minimal.
¶79
Compulsory licenses certainly could help address the problems developing with
geoengineering patents. The general resistance to their use, however, favors relying
primarily upon less disruptive measures. Perhaps, compulsory licenses might be most
useful as sticks to encourage voluntary participation in a less severe manner. Patent pools
provide precisely such a method.
D.
¶80

Patent Pools Allow the Retention of Rights and Provide Broader Access

The conditions for a patent pool arise when two or more patent holders control
related patents, but at least some manufacturers of the end-product do not possess
licenses.242 Stated simply, a patent pool is an agreement between two or more patent
holders to license their patent rights. The patent holders usually convey their rights to a
single entity, such as a limited liability partnership or corporation, allowing persons
interested in the patents to purchase licenses to the entity’s entire portfolio.243 Then, the
pool allocates the license fees to the patent owners pursuant to a predetermined
formula.244 Patent pools are typically voluntary organizations.245
235

Mandel, supra note 55, at 60.
Thomas, supra note 175, at 357. To avoid such concerns, Katherine Strandburg suggests that, after a
patent is granted, a moratorium be imposed before a compulsory license can be exercised. Katherine J.
Strandburg, What Does the Public Get?: Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 81,
143 (2004).
237
See Nunnenkamp, supra note 189, at 416–17.
238
See Yosick, supra note 70, at 1292.
239
See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 175, at 357.
240
Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215 (1980).
241
See Mandel, supra note 55, at 59.
242
Sovacool, supra note 48, at 433.
243
Nielsen & Samardzjia, supra note 177, at 530. This structure is typical, especially of some of the
more prominent patent pools discussed infra. In some instances, however, the patent owners merely license
their patents to one another. Different forms may reflect the different goals of the pool, such as upstream
research and development or downstream access. Krista L. Cox, The Medicines Patent Pool: Promoting
Access and Innovation for Life-Saving Medicines Through Voluntary Licenses, 4 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.
J. 291, 294–95 (2012).
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Cox, supra note 243, at 295.
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¶81

Patent pools are especially helpful in addressing patent thickets, where separate
patent holders own patents for individual, related components.246 Patent pools can also be
effective in remedying patent anticommons.247 Broadly stated, a patent pool solves both
the thicket and anticommons problems because it facilitates innovation by expanding the
number of persons who can utilize patented subject matter.248
¶82
One of the most prominent examples of a patent pool involved the early American
aviation industry. Following their historic invention, the Wright brothers sought and
received a broadly defined airplane patent.249 Subsequently, the founders of flight
attempted to block nearly all airplanes as infringements upon their patent.250 Further
exacerbating “a chaotic situation concerning the validity and ownership of important
aeronautical patents,” various aircraft companies threatened competitors with patent
infringement suits.251 Because of the years of protracted litigation, at the start of the First
World War, the U.S. aviation industry had produced a fraction of the number of planes
produced by either France or Germany.252
¶83
Upon the United States’ entry into the war, the federal government chose to
intervene, in part through the efforts of then-Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin D.
Roosevelt.253 The U.S. government faced difficulty fulfilling plane orders and, as the
principal purchaser of aircraft, greatly suffered from increased prices. Airplanes required
components covered by a number of patents, and manufacturers were afraid of possible
infringement suits.254 To resolve this problem, the Manufacturers Aircraft Association
(MAA) incorporated in 1917.255 Manufacturers of aircraft and related parts purchased a
share of the association,256 enabling them to exercise licenses on key patents shared in the
pool.257 This arrangement was so successful that, upon its expiration after the war, the
War and Navy Departments negotiated a new agreement with the MAA.258 By the end of
the 1920’s, the aviation industry, which had produced only 100 planes preceding the war,
was manufacturing 7,500 planes annually.259

245

See Contreras, supra note 191, at 674–75.
Id. at 655.
247
See JEANNE CLARK ET AL., USPTO, PATENT POOLS: A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF ACCESS IN
BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENTS? 4 (2000), available at www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/
patentpool.pdf.
248
Lanning, supra note 50, at 412. Other recognized benefits include reducing licensing costs (including
litigation) and managing and administering the agreement and parties. Cox, supra note 243, at 295.
249
LAWRENCE GOLDSTONE, BIRDMEN 86–87 (2014).
250
MATTHEW ALBRIGHT, PROFITS PENDING: HOW LIFE PATENTS REPRESENT THE BIGGEST SWINDLE OF
THE 21ST CENTURY 145 (2004).
251
Mfrs. Aircraft Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 77 Ct. Cl. 481, 483 (Ct. Cl. 1933).
252
ALBRIGHT, supra note 250. At the commencement of hostilities, France had manufactured 2,000
airplanes, Germany 1,000, and the United States fewer than 100. Id.
253
Contreras, supra note 191, at 675 n.137.
254
Mfrs. Aircraft Ass’n, Inc., 77 Ct. Cl. at 483.
255
Id. at 486. Its founders modeled the MAA after a similar entity formed at the beginning of the
century to address comparable issues concerning patents related to automobiles. ALBRIGHT, supra note 250,
at 146.
256
Mfrs. Aircraft Ass’n, Inc., 77 Ct. Cl. at 486.
257
ALBRIGHT, supra note 250, at 146. The MAA enabled the Navy to avoid spending an appropriation
of $1 million to purchase or condemn basic aeronautic patents. Mfrs. Aircraft Ass’n, Inc., 77 Ct. Cl. at 488.
258
Mfrs. Aircraft Ass’n, Inc., 77 Ct. Cl. at 502.
259
ALBRIGHT, supra note 250, at 146.
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Providing a more recent example, in 2009, UNITAID formed the Medicines Patent
Pool (MPP) using the MAA as a model.260 Several countries established UNITAID to
develop a financing mechanism providing regular, sustainable, and predictable long-term
financing for drugs and diagnostics used to treat AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria in
developing countries.261 But while UNITAID created the MPP using the MAA as its
guiding framework,262 the arrangements differ in significant ways. Most obviously,
participation in the MPP is voluntary, whereas the MAA was not.263 Further, the MPP
negotiates with generic-drug manufacturers for non-exclusive licenses,264 which extend to
multiple uses (e.g., a drug typically used for HIV can also be produced to treat hepatitis
B), but not to new uses.265 Finally, employing modern technology to its advantage, the
MPP publishes on its website the names of relevant pharmaceutical companies that have
or have not joined the pool.266
¶85
Thus, while UNITAID used the MAA as a blueprint, the MPP’s structure was
uniquely tailored not only to a specific field, but also to modern realities. These
distinctions illustrate the utility and flexibility of patent pools in cultivating innovation
though cooperation. From the consolidation of sewing-machine inventions in the mid-19th
century267 to the standardization of modern radio and television,268 the past two centuries
are replete with examples of patent pools enabling the development of critical
technologies.269
¶86
Patent pools provide myriad advantages. For instance, they help resolve problems
arising from building-block patents. Typically, patent pools do this by providing
economic incentives for holders of building-block or component patents to cooperate
when developing end-products.270 This is what essentially transpired in the aviation
industry during World War I.271 Patents on fundamental inventions coupled with a
general unwillingness to license the inventions at reasonable rates paralyzed the aviation
260

Cox, supra note 243, at 296.
Jorge Bermudez & Ellen ‘t Hoen, The UNITAID Patent Pool Initiative: Bringing Patents Together
for the Common Good, 4 OPEN AIDS J. 37, 37 (2010). The MPP receives its financing from a tax on airline
tickets established by the participating member countries. Id.
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See id. at 38.
263
Cox, supra note 243, at 296.
264
Id. at 296–97.
265
Id. at 303–04.
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See JACQUES DE WERRA, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LICENSING 233
(2013).
267
See DAVID SERAFINO, SURVEY OF PATENT POOLS DEMONSTRATES VARIETY OF PURPOSES AND
MANAGEMENT STRUCTURES 3 (2007).
268
Mireles, supra note 67, at 220–21. The Radio Corporation of America (RCA), which combined
several companies’ technologies, led to the standardizing of radio and television parts and transmissions.
Prior to the formation of RCA, a number of separate entities held important patents, enabling them to block
one another. Moreover, radio systems required several technologies, each of which involved multiple
patents. Accordingly, the industry was deadlocked. Once again, the parties resolved their differences after
prompting from the Navy Department. See TEECE, supra note 107, at 207.
269
Contreras, supra note 191, at 674–75. Recent examples include patent pools formed for CDs, DVDs,
Bluetooth, and MPEG. Id.
270
Stiles, supra note 92, at 576.
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Although the MAA was technically a voluntary patent pool, many commentators consider it to have
been a de facto mandatory patent pool. See Contreras, supra note 191, at 675 n.137. If necessary, the
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SERAFINO, supra note 267, at 16.
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industry. Establishing a patent pool through the MAA provided manufacturers with
access to these inventions, enabling the production of airplanes at a greatly enhanced
pace.272
Another key advantage is that patent pools help reduce licensing-transaction costs.
Patent pools minimize or avoid many costs of acquiring licenses. These avoided costs
include patent searches and possible litigation expenses related to patent infringement
actions.273 Pools also help minimize the effort required to address questionable patents,
such as those that are either invalid or excessively vague.274 They provide even greater
efficiencies when patents on complementary technologies are available through the
pool.275 Patent pools can thus provide an efficient, “one-stop” shopping means for
acquiring access to patents that are essential for a given technology.276
Patent pools also have benefits over involuntary licenses and the effects thereof,
such as those resulting from compulsory licensing schemes or litigation. Pools, unlike
involuntary measures, derive their valuations and royalty prices from the consensus of
persons involved in the industry. This increases the likelihood that they fairly reflect their
market value.277
The most common criticism of patent pools stems from their potentially
anticompetitive impact. In the past, some have used patent pools to collude and fix
prices.278 Consequently, federal regulators and courts historically have viewed patent
pools with skepticism. In recent years, however, these critics have more readily
acknowledged a patent pool’s ability to encourage innovation.279 Indeed, the joint
guidelines of the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice recognize that
patent pools provide procompetitive benefits.280 Many commentators note that careful
scrutiny of the pooling arrangement can minimize anticompetitive tendencies.281
Patent pools can help address the thickets and anticommons developing with
climate-engineering patents. Furthermore, a geoengineering pool is likely to avoid the
resistance that more disruptive approaches, such as patent breaking or compulsory
licenses, would engender. Similar to how patent pools played critical roles in making
radio and airplane inventions available, patent pools can again help provide access to
inventions that may play a crucial role in society’s future.
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CLARK ET AL., supra note 247, at 8.
Id.
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Nielsen & Samardzjia, supra note 177, at 530.
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Stiles, supra note 92, at 587.
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CLARK ET AL., supra note 247, at 9. Patent pools also reduce the likelihood that, after licenses have
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See Mireles, supra note 67, at 220.
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Nielsen & Samardzjia, supra note 177, at 530–31.
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See id. at 219.
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THE UNITED STATES SHOULD IMPLEMENT CHANGES TO THE PATENT SYSTEM TO
ADDRESS CLIMATE ENGINEERING

Because of the rapid acceleration in geoengineering patents and the growing
urgency of climate change, the United States needs to modify its patent system to
facilitate these inventions. First, it should establish a separate process for consideration of
these applications, including a process for expedited review. Second, to facilitate access
to these patents, the U.S. government should encourage the establishment of a patent
pool, which would provide limited licenses for climate-engineering innovation. The
government should also be empowered to ensure that all essential patents join the pool.
A.

The United States Needs a Unique Patent Process for
Climate-Engineering Inventions

¶92

A patent system tailored for geoengineering patents must provide for quick review.
Not only will this require an expedited-review mechanism, but it should also include
separate application and review procedures for climate engineering. Specifically, the
USPTO should establish a separate application process staffed by examiners specializing
in geoengineering patents. Experience indicates that such procedures accelerate
review.282 In addition, a separate process will help the USPTO develop sufficient
expertise to analyze and resolve these applications. This is especially important because,
unlike most industries, the geoengineering field resembles an umbrella, incorporating a
number of diverse technologies under a common goal.283 Furthermore, future methods
may be unforeseeable. Thus, the establishment of a separate office with a dedicated staff
would facilitate the approval of related inventions and enable the staff to stay abreast of
recent developments in the field. Finally, as examiners develop greater expertise, they are
less likely to approve broadly defined patents, which would help mitigate problems
associated with thickets and anticommons at their source.
¶93
A separate process will also centralize information about geoengineering patents.
Currently, applications do not need to identify their inventions as related to climate
engineering. Consequently, searching for related patents is unduly time consuming.284
Identifying geoengineering patent applications separately will facilitate both the
examination process by the USPTO and their subsequent identification by third parties,
such as future inventors and manufacturers.
¶94
Recent evidence further supports the conclusion that, by establishing a separate
application process, the USPTO can review applications more easily and expeditiously.

282

See Deborah Behles, The New Race: Speeding up Climate Change Innovation, 11 N.C. J. L. & TECH.
1, 41 (2009). Ms. Behles points to the experience under the Orphan Drug Act. The Food and Drug
Administration established the Office of Orphan Products Development to review applications and award
orphan designations. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., THE ORPHAN DRUG ACT: IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACT
4 (2001), available at oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-09-00-00380.pdf. The office has reduced the time
required to designate a product by 40%. Id. at 10–11.
283
Included under this heading are methods such as carbon capture and sequestration, ocean
fertilization, aerosol injection, enhanced ocean circulation, cloud whitening, enhanced surface albedo,
space mirrors, and others. BRACMORT & LATTANZIO, supra note 133, at 10–19.
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See Oldham et al., supra note 73, at 9. They reported that their search terms “generated unexpected
noise” and the results were “diffuse.” Id.
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In 2009, the USPTO initiated its Green Technology Pilot Program (GTPP).285 The
program provided a means for green-technology patent applications to receive
preferential consideration without needing to satisfy all of the accelerated-examination
program’s requirements.286 While the GTPP ended in March 2012,287 subsequent analysis
determined that the separate process used for that program did in fact facilitate expedited
review.288 Accelerated consideration is critical for geoengineering patents because of the
prolonged time required to research and test these technologies,289 especially given that
climate change is already surpassing tipping points.290 For these reasons, geoengineering
patents provide a more compelling case for expedited consideration than do patents in
most other fields.
¶95
As did the GTPP, this new climate-engineering program should attempt to limit
burdens placed upon applicants. Analysis suggests that added burdens—such as prior-art
searches—deter applicants from using the accelerated-examination procedures.291 Unlike
the GTPP, however, this new program needs to provide expedited review throughout the
application process. Stahl and Beshore found this approach to mesh successfully with the
USPTO’s accelerated-examination process.292
¶96
Additionally, a separate process would enable the USPTO to develop a public
database of climate-engineering patents. Such a database could reduce transaction costs
resulting from preparing applications and prior-art searches.293 It would also help other
inventors, researchers, and the public stay informed of developments concerning these
technologies. For instance, a similar database, GenBank, exists for genetic sequences.294
The National Institutes of Health designed GenBank to provide the scientific community
access to the most up-to-date DNA-sequence information.295 Similarly, a geoengineering
database can facilitate access to information about climate-engineering patents.
B.
¶97

The United States Should Establish a Geoengineering Patent Pool to Facilitate
Access to These Patents

Besides modifying the application process, the United States needs to ensure access
to climate-engineering inventions to spur innovation. To this end, it should facilitate the
establishment of a patent pool, and encourage or compel inventors to join. Furthermore,
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Tran, supra note 66, at 526. The implementation of the GTPP followed the adoption of similar
programs in Australia, Japan, South Korea, and the United Kingdom. Id. at 525–26.
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Pilot Program for Green Techs Including Greenhouse Gas Reduction, 74 Fed. Reg. 64,666, 64,666
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pre-examination search for prior art. Jay Hickey, Green Technology: An Alternative Path to Accelerated
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the United States should structure licenses for the pool’s patents to minimize costs to
innovators.
¶98
The patent system needs to provide inventors sufficient access to climateengineering patents. Following a model previously established to address the urgent need
for patent-barrier elimination, the U.S. government can achieve this goal. Nearly one
century ago, the United States used the urgency of a World War and the threat of
compulsory licensing to break two patent logjams. This prodding resulted in the
establishment of the MAA and RCA.296 Similarly, the United States should encourage the
creation of a climate-engineering patent pool, which, for simplicity, this Article will refer
to as “GeoPool.”
¶99
GeoPool would present significant advantages over the current patent model and
the various alternatives. Pools have previously helped break through barriers created by
overlapping and diffuse patent distributions.297 The “one-stop shopping” opportunity that
pools provide to innovators enables efficient and inexpensive access to patents,298 which
facilitates fair licensing rates299 and spurs investment.300 Thus, by improving access and
minimizing costs, pools can foster innovation301 and centralize information related to
climate engineering and inventions. To accomplish this, GeoPool will need an
administrator to determine which patents to include in the pool.302 This is especially
important because of the breadth of technologies falling under the heading of climate
engineering that continue to evolve,303 thus requiring the parameters of the pool to be
interpreted flexibly.304
¶100
Because of the likely variety of inventions included in this pool, measures should
be included to minimize the royalties that prospective licensees must pay for access to
only some of the pool’s patents. Specifically, GeoPool should utilize provisions that limit
licensees’ costs. For instance, severable or unbundled licenses allow a party to obtain
licenses to fewer than all of the patents in the pool.305 This is important since innovators
rarely know in advance which rights will be essential in developing an invention.306 In
addition, the inclusion of termination rights would allow pool members to terminate a
license on one or more patents while retaining their rights to other licenses.307 Such rights
help reduce licensing costs for technologies that become dead ends. In other words,
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See id. at 57–58 (noting that the establishment of a pool concerning severe acute respiratory
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at 1168.
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termination rights allow innovators to limit their investment in licenses that prove to be
unproductive, thus encouraging innovator participation in the pool.
¶101
In this same vein, GeoPool should require that participants provide only a field-ofuse license limited to geoengineering uses.308 This limited license would allow pool
members to utilize the patent for climate-engineering purposes while enabling original
patent holders to retain patent rights over non-geoengineering uses. Thus, original patent
holders could still benefit from the ability to license and receive royalties for these other
uses. Since many climate-engineering inventions may have other applications,309 this
significantly eases the blow of losing royalties from geoengineering uses.
¶102
Finally, following previous frameworks, the federal government should utilize a
combination of “carrots” and “sticks” to ensure inclusion of essential patents. As with
prior patent pools, membership in GeoPool should be voluntary, if possible. Hopefully,
the access that membership in the pool allows to other technologies, much as IBM gained
by licensing its patents, will provide a sufficient “carrot” to incentivize widespread
membership.310 But just as the United States was one century ago, it must be willing to
utilize some “sticks” to prod patent holders into joining GeoPool. For instance, for
geoengineering patents that do not join the pool, the USPTO can reexamine the patent to
determine whether to narrow or break it. Although patent breaking is an extreme, rarely
utilized solution,311 as discussed previously, it is one of several tools available for the
U.S. government to compel licenses, along with exercising its march-in rights for
federally funded inventions.312
¶103
Yet the most palatable “stick” in this scenario lies in compulsory licensing.
Although the United States lacks a general compulsory license provision,313 the exercise
of such a provision would be consistent with international agreements like TRIPS314 and
NAFTA.315 These agreements allow compulsory licenses to be granted during national
emergencies, or in the alternative, for public, noncommercial uses.316 However, in
circumstances requiring urgent and coordinated action such as this, adding a provision to
the Patent Act that allows private parties to practice a license in the public interest would
be most beneficial, perhaps mirroring a similar provision in the Atomic Energy Act.317
Ideally, the legislation would provide an expedited process whereby the USPTO could
308
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rule upon pertinent requests.318 Of course, should actual implementation of a method
become necessary, the United States’ right to exercise a compulsory license over any
patent it has authorized ensures that it can guarantee access to essential inventions.319
VI. CONCLUSION
¶104

The geoengineering-patent land-grab has already begun. These technologies,
however, may become critical to society’s response to climate change. Because of the
importance of these technologies, the United States needs to ensure that these patents do
not deter innovation or prevent these technologies from being available for
implementation. Specifically, it should develop unique procedures to approve these
applications and form a geoengineering patent pool that will facilitate both innovation
and accessibility.

318

In other contexts, commentators have suggested modifying the terms of patents to encourage or
facilitate joining pools. For instance, Caitlin Lanning proposes conditioning the awarding of gene patents
upon joining a gene patent pool. Lanning, supra note 50, at 413. Dana Beldiman, on the other hand,
suggests imposing a default trigger that would impose a fixed royalty upon a patented invention for failure
to join a pool for influenza medicines. Beldiman, supra note 104, at 59. While the Lanning proposal may
be more drastic than would be necessary, the Beldiman default trigger may suggest an approach that is
worthy of further consideration. Lanning also proposes shortening the exclusivity period for certain patents.
Lanning, supra note 50, at 409–10. While Lanning’s proposal might be helpful, the establishment of a
geoengineering patent pool should obviate the need for such a remedy.
319
28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2012).
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